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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the conditional correlation between pref-
erence for redistribution and the perceived role of \circumstances"
and \eort" using the Chinese General Social Survey. I found very
signicant correlations, thus validating the hypothesis of \sense of
justice" for China. The migrant worker group who has dual identi-
ty (living/working in an urban area while being registered as a ru-
ral individual) is analysed in order to identify a discrimination eect
(induced by the Chinese rural-urban segmentation policy) upon at-
titudes. However, being migrant is an endogenous variable to the
attitude variables and the consistent estimate of this eect is much
more important than the eect produced by a nave estimate. The
econometric model is a multivariate triangular LDV system with a bi-
nary endogenous explanatory variable estimated via a GHK simulator
method. To implement the GHK calculations, I propose a parametric
constraint to impose the positivity of the 3 3 correlation matrix. A
generalisation for higher dimension cases is provided.
During the writing of this paper, I have beneted from very useful conversations with
Michel Lubrano, Habiba Djebbari, Emmanuel Flachaire and Gilles Stuper. Of course,
remaining errors are solely mine. This work has been carried out thanks to the support
of the A*MIDEX project (No ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02) funded by the \Investissements
d'Avenir" French Government program, managed by the French National Research Agency
(ANR).
yAix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS,
GREQAM, F-13002 Marseille, France
1
Keywords: Preference for redistribution, inequality perceptions, con-
ditional correlation, Hukou and migrant worker, binary endogenous,
GHK simulator.
JEL classication: C36, D19, H23, J18.
Acknowledgement
Data analyzed in this paper were collected by the research
project \China General Social Survey(CGSS)" sponsored by
the China Social Science Fundation. This research project
was carried out by Department of Sociology, Renmin Univer-
sity of China & Social Science Division, Hong Kong Science
and Technology University, and directed by Dr. Li Lulu &
Dr. Bian Yanjie. The author appreciate the assistance in
providing data by the institutes and individuals aforemen-
tioned. The views expressed herein are the author's own.
1 Introduction: Inequality in China
After nearly two decades of economic stagnation, China started market-
oriented reforms in December 1978. Being the world's fastest growing
economy over the last 30 years, growth came together with an inequal-
ity increase and the latter became one of the most important issues.
The income distribution changed dramatically since the mid-1980s.
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the over-all Gini index
has grown from 0.35 in 1990 to over 0.45 in 2006. Using the Chinese
household nutrition survey, Chen and Cowell (2013) claim that in the
post-millennium area, climbing on the income ladder has become more
dicult.
The social reforms and the fast economic growth have aected d-
ierent groups of people in dierent ways. The rural/urban gap has
increased. The Hukou policy can be thought of being the cause of this
widening gap. This state policy was adopted to limit mass migrations
from the land to the cities, to ensure both economic and political social
stability. The state favours urban residents and discriminates against
rural residents in resource allocation, such as education, job vacancies,
social benets, health care, etc... (Afridi et al. 2012). Moreover, the
redistribution scheme is decentralized in China as it mostly depends on
the local economic level. This signies that the subsistence allowances
are much lower in rural areas than in urban areas (Houkai and Xiaoxia
2009). Thus being \rural" or being \urban" entails a huge discrepan-
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cy in terms of living standards and mostly in terms of opportunities.
On the other hand, production activities in rural areas depend most-
ly on land farming although the labour-output ratio can vary a lot.
Urban poor people have no access to means of production and they
relies more on low paid job salaries and subsistence allowances. Rural
individuals can decide to move to or to work in cities in order to have
a relative higher income, but they will not necessarily be registered as
\urban" ocially. Although these rural labour forces contributed to
a very important part in the economic development and urban mod-
ernization, the discrimination entailed by the Hukou system prevents
them from having access to the benets of the fruits of development
in an equal way (Wong et al. 2007). The dierences in rural and ur-
ban living and working circumstances and the isolation of rural people
might lead to divergences in the perceptions of poverty between rural
and urban people.
The urban group could be the beneciary of growth in urban ar-
eas, but we also observe a signicant group of the urban population
who lives in a state of poverty (Fang et al. 2002). For example, in the
early 90s, a great number of urban workers experienced the privati-
zation of state owned enterprizes where they worked. Following this
privatization, they became laid-o workers. This event consistently
inuenced their own life and that of their families. They dropped into
the disadvantaged group.
The groups who beneted from most of these social and econom-
ic reforms are the government ocers, businessmen, and people who
have relations to them. They climbed up fast on the social ladder
and distanced themselves from the pack by far. The increasing in-
equality becomes a potential risk for the stability of the society. The
inter-regional inequality is also important. The east coastal provinces
developed much faster than the interior provinces due to a series of
preferential policies (Demurger et al. 2002). This divergence should
contribute to the over-all inequality.
In the literature, we have plenty of evidence and discussions about
inequality in China, see for instance, Kanbur and Zhang (1999), Khan
and Riskin (1998), Khan and Riskin (2001), etc. Although, how people
perceive inequality is less discussed in the literature. Some researchers
have noticed the ten times increased number of mass protests in China
from 1993 to 1995. This leads to the conclusion that Chinese ordinary
people are angrier about the rising inequality (Tanner 2006). The
Chinese government also notices this risk. During the term of oce
of the former leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, they put for-
ward a slogan called "harmonious society" as well as series of policies
to stabilize the society and to inhibit the dissatised. However, in a
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recent paper of Whyte et al. (2009), the author provides some evi-
dence averse to these worries. By studying a national-wide inequality
attitude survey, he concludes that the dissatisfaction for inequality
has been overestimated in China. For example, the rural group is not
more depressed by the inequality than the urban group as was as-
sumed. According to this author, the rural group is more dissatised
by procedural injustice rather than by distributive injustice. More-
over, unlike the urban group, the rural group has a limited perception
of the real social ladder and people of that group tend to compare
themselves to people who live in the same village. These conclusions
come from the fact that rural individuals report the inequality within
their community which is moderate. On the other hand, because the
urban group has seen many upstart examples around them, they tend
to be more depressed by inequality.
One question related to the inequality perceptions is the prefer-
ence for redistribution, which is not a well developed topic in China.
It also reects people's inequality perception and adverts to how in-
dividuals perceive themselves as compared to others. Moreover, the
topic of preference for redistribution is a natural experiment that be-
stows the possibility to survey many other topics, such as altruism
and risk aversion. Lastly, does inequality perception inuence the
preference for redistribution? The correlation between preference for
redistribution and inequality perception arises as an important issue
in this study. Since the forming of the preference for redistribution is
rather complex, many factors that determine the preference are unob-
servable, especially the value orientation and psychological traits. In
Xu and Liu (2013), the authors show the importance of both social
justice recognition and self-interest variables for explaining preference
for redistribution. Unfortunately, this paper neglects the possibility
of endogeny caused by the correlation between preference for redistri-
bution and justice recognition.
The eect of Hukou policy is also less discussed in the preference
for redistribution literature. As an national-wide policy that discrim-
inates against the rural group, what would be the potential eect of
such system upon attitudes? Is being a migrant worker an endoge-
nous factor for attitude analysis? Wong et al. (2007) has shown the
policy that discriminates towards migrant workers. Thus the decision
of migration is not simply economically driven and rural individuals
have to take into account many factors, which might be inuenced by
dierent perceptions and attitudes.
The aim of this paper is to provide some evidence concerning the
forming of preference for redistribution and poverty perceptions in
China and the relation between them. The eect of Hukou policy
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upon preference and perceptions is also discussed. This paper is orga-
nized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature about preference for
redistribution and some important theories in this domain. Section
3 introduces the data base and discusses the choice of the potential
determinants of preference for redistribution. Section 4 discusses one
of the key variables in the preference for redistribution study, which
is the occupation prestige scale and its readjustment for the Chinese
society. A trivariate ordered probit model is introduced and discussed
in section 5. Empirical evidence are given in Section 6 with further
discussions of \migrant workers" along with a more realistic speci-
cation up to a quadrivariate model that copes with the endogeneity
problem. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preference for redistribution and per-
ception of poverty: a literature review
The literature about preferences for redistribution started with the
static model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), based on the median
voter theory of Romer (1975). It assumes that if the median income
is lower than the mean income and if the government does nothing
more than taxing the richer group (above the mean income level) and
redistributing the taxes to the poor, then they will be a majority of
population who will vote for a higher tax rate.
This main result of the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) can
break down if we considerer a dynamic framework where the voter
introduces his future income in his utility function. If it is so, then
people who earn an income lower than the mean level today are not
necessarily interested in a redistribution policy if they anticipate that
they would climb up over the mean level tomorrow. This idea was
formalized with the prospect of upward mobility (POUM hypothesis)
of Benabou and Ok (2001). Within a dynamic framework, the median
voter theory may no longer hold because individuals maximize their
inter-temporal utility where their expected future income appears as
an argument. They can vote against redistribution if their anticipation
function is a concave function of their income.
The two models (static and dynamic) were tested on dierent data
set. Even if it is now out of fashion, the static model of Meltzer and
Richard (1981) was tested by Karabarbounis (2011) using the OECD
SOCX data set over 14 countries. He found that more inequality was
related to an increase in the demand for redistribution. However,
people have become much more concerned the dynamic model. Us-
ing several data sets, economists and sociologists found proofs of the
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\POUM" eect in majoritarian democratic societies. For instance,
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) used the GSS (General Social Survey)
and the PSID to relate income dynamics to preference for redistribu-
tion in the US. They found a POUM eect. Using the BHPS, Clark
and d'Angelo (2008) found the upward/downward mobility eect when
analyzing intergenerational mobility.
Economically, the \POUM" hypothesis relies on the specication
of a particular individual dynamic utility function where only self in-
terest is at work. However, preferences could be impacted by ideology,
culture and family traditions and not simply by income levels or by
income expectations as detailed in Piketty (1995) or in Benabou and
Tirole (2006). See also Neustadt (2011) and Scheve et al. (2006) for
the eect of beliefs and religion.
Researchers have paid a lot of attention to the role of political
ideology that generates dierences between voters, dierences based
on issues such as equality, fairness, and the role of government, see
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Bean and Papadakis (1998), Feldman and
Zaller (1992). Most of the discussions are around the relation between
preference for redistribution and ideology as led around stylized facts.
For example, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) try to explain why the EU
society is more supportive of redistribution while the US society is
much less supportive. They found that in US the majority tends to
believe that poverty is generated by a lack of eort while the EU
society tends to impute poverty to misfortune. The author points out
that the link between preference for redistribution and beliefs about
the nature of poverty relies on the sense of justice: \if you believe
that luck (or inherited wealth) determines dierences in income, you
are more favorable to redistribution. If you believe that individuals'
eort and individual's ability determine income, you are less favorable
to redistribution" (Alesina and Angeletos 2005). In other words, it is
a common sense that people should hold responsibilities for factors
which are under their own control (i.e. lack of eorts) while they hold
no responsibilities to external factors which are out of their control
(i.e. circumstances), see for instance Rawls (1971) and Sen (1980)
and Sen (1999).
Of course, dierences in perception for the role of eort, luck/misfortune
and preference for redistribution go back to long lasting historical and
cultural dierences between the two sides of the Atlantic. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) point out that the correlations are strong and provoca-
tive. This indicate that we cannot explain preference for redistribution
as a function of poverty perception, but that these variables have to
be explained simultaneously. At the individual level, many factors in-
cluding one's life experiences, family background, psychological traits,
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social attitudes, ethics and the world outlook are usually unobserv-
able. However, people who believe that luck determines success might
still know the importance of eort. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) fur-
ther point out that recognitions of luck and eort can be inuenced
by economic and political policies while redistribution policies are the
revealed preference for redistribution of the majority in a democratic
society. Fong (2001) emphasises that poverty perceptions are corre-
lated with self-interest variables which leads to the question: what
are the determinants of poverty perceptions? The causality of prefer-
ence and perceptions is complex and simultaneous, while it is possible
to quantitatively measure the correlations among these factors condi-
tioned on exogenous variables.
In a recent paper of Xu and Liu (2013), authors enter self-interest
variables and \key to success" variables jointly in the preference for
redistribution equation. However, they assume that \key to sucess"
variables are exogenous. Ignoring the simultaneity of the system would
entail a serious endogenous problem. Although their results provide
some evidence concerning the sense of justice, the problem is now
how to determine the relation between preference for redistribution
and the poverty perception in an ecient way. We shall provide a
specic econometric model for that.
3 The Chinese General Social Survey
The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) is an annual or biannu-
al repeated cross-section survey designed to collect individual opin-
ions on social trends and the changing relationship between social
structure and quality of life in China. CGSS is a sub-project of the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Following the struc-
ture of the famous general social survey (GSS), the CGSS provides
multi-dimensional information on both socio-economic characteristic-
s, attitudes and values on social issues. For the same reason as for the
GSS, the respondents of each survey wave are randomly selected so
that they cannot be supposed to be followed repeatedly so as to avoid
selection bias and so as to ensure that the sample is representative of
the whole population in each wave. The rst wave was collected in
2003 and the last wave in 2010. The rst wave provides very limited
information while the social value part of the 2010 wave is not yet
published. In this paper, we choose the 2006 wave because it contains
the richest information available on social values. In this wave, 28
provinces are included, including Beijing, Shanghai, and some of the
other most developed direct-controlled municipalities. This makes a
total of 9 517 observations.
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The 2006 CGSS is organized in four parts: The individual socio-
demographics characteristics, the occupation status, the household
components and status, and most importantly for us the subjective
attitude variables.
3.1 Exogenous variables
Two types of explanatory variables are considered:
- Socio-demographic variables: region, gender, birth cohort, party
membership, religion belief, material status, rural/urban status
and years of education.
- Individual socio-economic variables: income, occupation pres-
tige, occupation mobility with respect to that of the parents,
and subjective expectation of household future socio-economic
status.
There are 28 provinces included in the data set. We regroup them
into three regions:
- E.C. China (41.7%): East coast of China. The most developed
provinces and the big cities of China (including Beijing, Shanghai
and Shenzhen) and the three northeast provinces. This region
has the most developed industries and the most developed third
sector.
- C. China (26.5%): Central China. Less developed than the E.C,
including the traditional agriculture provinces (Henan, Hunan,
Hubei, etc).
- W. China (31.8%): The west of China, the least developed re-
gion.
The weighted sample proportions are given in parentheses. Descriptive
statistics are given in Table 1.
The income variable includes all sources of individual income re-
ceived in the year 2005 (currency unit: RMB). The summary table
is shown in Table 2. There are 805 income missing observations and
1 003 observations with a zero income.
A subjective measure of the future upward mobility is also con-
sidered, the self-reported question: How do you perceive your future
household nancial situation in three yeas ahead, is it better (coded as
1) or not (coded as 0, includes the same and worse).
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Table 1: Socio-economic descriptive statistics
using individual weights
Gender
female 0.516
male 0.484
Birth cohorts
-1959 0.162
1960-1979 0.462
1980- 0.376
Party membership
member 0.152
mass 0.846
Religious beliefs
Believer 0.137
atheist 0.846
Living in a couple
yes 0.866
no 0.134
\Rural" in 2005
yes 0.619
no 0.381
(Rural)\Migrant worker" in 2005
yes 0.060
no 0.940
Being \New urban" (change within 10 years)
yes 0.046
no 0.954
Years of education
1st Qu. 6
Median 9
average 9.1
3rd Qu. 12
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Table 2: Annual Income distribution in Chinese currency
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Income distribution 0 2 000 5 000 8 824 11 300 250 000
3.2 Dependent variables: Social values and opin-
ions
In the attitude part of the survey, respondents are requested to re-
port their opinions on a four-level scale tracing agreement to a given
proposition (1 for totally disagree and 4 for totally agree). We have
selected the three following questions:
1. Government should tax the rich more to help the poor.
2. Individuals are poor because society is not well functioning, es-
pecially because of misgoverning.
3. Individuals are poor because they are lazy
Descriptive statistics for social values and opinions are given in Table
3. A rst glance at this Table gives us the impression that these are
Table 3: Attitude and perceptions
1 2 3 4
Redis. Pref. 0.030 0.173 0.528 0.275
Poor. misgov 0.025 0.206 0.588 0.181
Poor. lazy 0.201 0.467 0.265 0.078
very similar questions. The distribution of preferences for redistribu-
tion is roughly the same as that of the poor.misgov variable. The
poor.lazy variable is distributed just as the complementary distribu-
tion of the above two variables. This again conrms the warning of
potential endogeneity problems. The ideology variables and prefer-
ence for redistribution are jointly determined by unobserved factors
such as value orientations and character traits.
4 Occupation and Social mobility
Clark and d'Angelo (2008) have shown that the inter-generational
prestige mobility between father and son have a signicant eect up-
on the preference for redistribution. In that paper, job prestige is
measured by the Hope-Goldthorpe Scale(HGS)1 which transforms the
1The HGS is an occupational index that reects the job's reputation and classies jobs
according to their social desirability.
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occupation norms over a continuous scale. A precise measure of the
occupation prestige should reect the social ranking and the social
class of individuals which are correlated to their preferences and per-
ceptions.
In China, the Hukou system also contributes to the dierences in
occupations as well as to the occupation mobility. The migration from
rural to urban regions is constrained which would limit the opportuni-
ties (discrimination) of \rural" people. Consequently, the Hukou sys-
tem may have far-reaching inuence upon preferences and perceptions
through their life-cycle experiences and occupations.
In the CGSS, the individual's current job occupation and father's
occupation are coded using the usual Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Por-
tocarero (EGP) classication. This corresponds to:
1. Category I (40%): farm labor
2. Category II (26%): skilled/unskilled worker
3. Category III (12%): self employed
4. Category IV (10%): lower sales-service/routine non-manual
5. Category V (11%): higer/lower controllers
The EGP classes are ranked on the basis of two dimensions: Employ-
ee monitoring diculties and human asset specicity (required on the
job training), see for instance Edlund (2008). Both the HGS and EGP
scales are designed for measurement purpose in western societies. It
is not evident that the ordering entailed by the EGP classication is
well adapted for China. In the following subsections, we will discuss
the properties of inter-generational mobility in China and its conse-
quences. Based on the following discussion, we will show that the
EGP occupation prestige scale is not suitable for China. As a con-
sequence, we have to build a proper measure of occupation prestige
and the corresponding occupation mobility instead of using directly
the EGP classication.
4.1 Markov Inter-generational mobility
Like any other occupation variable, the EGP classication provides
not only the occupation categories but also their corresponding pres-
tige ranking. If the assumed prestige ranking does not adapt properly
to China, it provides a misleading information for analyzing the inter-
generational mobility and thus the preference for redistribution. The
occupation mobility is one way to verify the validity of the assumed
prestige ranking because the mobility monotonicity property holds if
and only if the prestige ranking is monotone increasing.
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As we have this classication both for the respondent and his/her
father (current occupation or before retirement), we can model inter-
generational mobility. Using these ve ordered categories, we estimate
a weighted Markov transition matrix to model an inter-generational
transition matrix2 which is reported in Table 4. We see that mobility
Table 4: Inter-generational mobility, Prais Index = 0.774
EGP:1 EGP:2 EGP:3 EGP:4 EGP:5
EGP:1 0.54 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.07
EGP:2 0.09 0.44 0.08 0.23 0.15
EGP:3 0.17 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.08
EGP:4 0.06 0.28 0.14 0.32 0.19
EGP:5 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.21 0.29
is lower in lower rows and that the rst row is the most sticky one.
The rst row corresponds to the mobility probabilities of individuals
having a father in the farm labor category. Implicitly, this refers
to the mobility of individuals who originally come from rural areas
which indicates a signicant policy barrier eect brought by the Hukou
system. When his father was working in a farm, an individual has a
probability of 0.54 to also work in a farm. For all the other categories,
the probability for an individual to occupy the same type of job as his
father is much lower.
4.2 Occupation mobility
However, the commonly applied EGP prestige scale might not t the
Chinese social ladder as it is designed for Western societies. In this
subsection, I use the stereotype ordered regression (SOR) model3 to
revise the ordering of the EGP scale. We want to explain the social
class segmentation determined by the EGP scale by observable con-
trol variables in order to estimate the implicit ranking of the social
occupations that individuals have in mind. The model is given as
2The transition matrix is estimated as:
Pjk = n jk =nj:;
where Pjk refers to the probability of moving from origin category j to destination category
k. njk is the weighted frequency of observations that move from j to k and nj: refers to
the weighted frequency of all the observations that origin from j.
3The \stereotype ordered regression" (SOR) is reported for instance in Anderson
(1984). See Hendrickx (2000) for an implementation in Stata.
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follows:
ski = k + k Xi + ki: (1)
The ski corresponds to the latent score (propensity) of category k for
individual i while the k refers to the category specic intercepts. Xi
is a set of observed variables that controls for the human capital (years
of education), basic demographic variables (birth cohort, gender and
rural/urban). Similarly to the unconditional Markov chain analysis
of previous subsection, we also include the occupation category of the
father in order to introduce inter-generational mobility. ki is the error
term which follows an extreme value distribution. The probability is
then delivered through a logit type link function.
Unlike the linear part of the standard multinomial logit model, a
SOR model constrains the category specic linear parameters k to
be the same over all the categories. So k =  whatever the value
of k. However at the same time, a new multiplicative variable k
is introduced which relaxes in a way that restriction. It serves to
measure the ordinal scale of the destination category ladder while this
is not considered in the standard model. For identication reasons,
we have to impose 1 = 0 and 5 = 1. To understand the new scaling
metric parameter k, we can write the log odds ratio of the two event
probabilities P (yi = k) versus P (yi = k
0) as:
log

P (yi = k)
P (yi = k0)

= k   k0 + (k   k0)Xi: (2)
We shall see that the explanatory variable eects are measured by
multiplying the category constant parameter  by an estimated cate-
gory scaling metric k. The higher the distance between k and k0 ,
the higher the magnitude of the eect given by X. In order to esti-
mate the scaling parameter k and the linear parameter , an iterative
method is used.4 Table 5 reports the estimate of the intergenerational
mobility (father's occupation versus current occupation of responden-
t). We shall see that the scaling metric k is not monotone increasing.
The scale of category III (skilled/unskilled worker) is higher than that
of category II (self-employed). This result is comparable to the nd-
ing of Wu (2007). In western societies, category III is ranked higher
than category II, see for instance Ganzeboom et al. (1989). One pos-
sible explanation given by Wu (2007) is that Chinese society (or more
4The estimation procedure is as follow: rst take the k scaling metric as given and
estimate , then take the estimated  as xed and estimate k. The standard errors of k
are not identied while the standard errors of  are conditional on the given scaling metric
k. For more details see Hendrickx (2000). The estimation is achieved by the \mclgen"
and \mclest" commands in the software Stata.
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generally all communist societies) has a long tradition to inhibit pri-
vate property. And eventually, becoming self-employed is easier than
nding a stable job in the administration. Self-employment is less pre-
ferred in China and only concerns farm labor. The highest gap occurs
between the rst place (category I) to the second (category III) on
the ladder, after that the dierences are much smaller. This result
shows an extreme low prestige of farm labor. Clearly, this occupa-
tion is found only in the \rural" group. The \SOR eect" reported
in Table 5 are the estimates of . We see that higher human capital
is associated with higher probability of upward mobility. Being rural
reduces the upward mobility probability while it could be weaken by
the birth cohort eect (being born after 1980). Individuals are more
likely to have a decent occupation if their fathers' occupation prestige
is higher. We should also notice the stickiness of farm labor category.
Lower categories have important negative eects upon the mobility for
the next generation, which might be due to the policy barrier made by
the Hukou system. From this analysis we see that the ordering of the
EGP scale is not suitable for China. Henceforward, we avoid inserting
directly the EGP category information. Instead, we use the trans-
formed scaling metric parameter k because it corrects the order of
the occupation category with information of the scaling metric of each
category. A dummy variable of inter-generational upward mobility is
then coded as 1 if the following mobility event 1fsfather = j; sson = kg
between two generations satises the condition that k > j .
5 A theoretical econometric model for
attitude variables
We have three opinion variables that correspond to discrete observa-
tions which might be correlated. To each of these m opinion variables
corresponds a level of unobserved utility zm. This level, for every
m 2 f1; 2; 3g is explained by a linear combination of exogenous vari-
ables X so that:
zm = X
0m + m:
The observation rule, relating the unobserved utility level zm to the
response variable Ym is
Ym = k if m;k 1 < zm < m;k:
Ym is the observed category vector which is reported in the survey,
taking the ordered values from 1 to 4 in our case. m;k is the threshold
parameter that locates the boundaries for the discrete responses over
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Table 5: Inter-generational occupation mobility
the SOR model
Scaling metrics
EGP:1 0.0000
EGP:2 0.6201
EGP:3 0.5865
EGP:4 0.8481
EGP:5 1.0000
intercepts
EGP:2 0:454
(0:137)
EGP:3  0:490
(0:133)
EGP:4  0:608
(0:184)
EGP:5  1:129
(0:214)
SOR eect
Father EGP:2: 0:321
(0:143)
Father EGP:3:  0:506
(0:256)
Father EGP:4: 0:821
(0:246)
Father EGP:5: 1:109
(0:196)
Cohort 60-70  0:328
(0:126)
Cohort post. 80 0:456
(0:134)
female  0:357
(0:080)
yeduc 0:361
(0:015)
Rural  4:153
(0:129)
Pseudo R2 0.234
N 8007
the support of the continuous latent utility variable zm.The error term
m is supposed to be normal of zero mean. For identication reasons,
the three variances are set equal to 1. The three ordered probit models
can be estimated separately, if the three error terms are uncorrelated.
In this case the probability of a basic event is equal to:
Pr(Ym = k) = (m;k  X 0m)  (m;k 1  X 0m):
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If the m error terms are correlated, the basic event is much more
complex and the three ordered probit models have to be estimated
jointly. This model is related to the multivariate probit model (see
e.g. Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). But here of course the dependent
variables are ordered and not just binary.
5.1 A trivariate ordered probit model
As a starting point, let us consider the distribution of the error term:0@12
3
1A  N(0;) (3)
where we have 1's on the diagonal of the symmetric covariance ma-
trix . If the o-diagonal elements (mn) are all 0, then the model
reduces to three independent ordered probit models. In order that 
be positive denite symmetric, the elements of  in
 =
0@ 1 12 1321 1 23
31 32 1
1A (4)
must verify some constraints, see next subsection.
Let us now consider the probability of the trivariate event (Y1 =
j; Y2 = k; Y3 = l). The evaluation of this probability requires the
evaluation of a trivariate Gaussian CDF:
Pr[Y1 = j; Y2 = k; Y3 = l] =Z 1;j z^1
1;j 1 z^1
Z 2;k z^2
2;k 1 z^2
Z 3;l z^3
3;l 1 z^3
3(1; 2; 3; )d1d2d3;
where z^1; z^2 and z^3 are the linear predictors X
0^m (m = 1; 2; 3), 3 is
the PDF of a trivariate normal distribution and  represents the vec-
tor of all correlation parameters. There are good numerical methods
for evaluating a bivariate normal CDF that are included in standard
packages. But for higher dimensions, simulation methods are usually
preferred. In our case, because of the truncation problem, the GHK
(Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulator seems to be a good candidate
because the truncations could be directly simulated.
In order to apply the GHK simulator, let us rewrite the previous
event probability as a product of conditional and marginal probabili-
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ties:
Pr(Y1 = j; Y2 = k; Y3 = l) =
Pr(Y1 = j) Pr(Y2 = kjY1 = j) Pr(Y3 = ljY1 = j; Y2 = k) =
Pr(1;j 1 < z^1 + 1 < 1;j)
Pr(2;k 1 < z^2 + 2 < 2;kj1;j 1 < z^1 + 1 < 1;j)
Pr(3;l 1 < z^3+3 < 3;lj1;j 1 < z^1+1 < 1;j ; 2;k 1 < z^2+2 < 2;k):
(5)
The diculty comes from the fact that the m are correlated. Let
A be the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition of  such that
AA0 = . Let us introduce three iid standard normal random variables
m so that we can express the m as a linear combination of the three
independent m:0@12
3
1A =
0@a11 0 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
1A0@12
3
1A ; (6)
or in an expanded notation:
1 = a111;
2 = a211 + a222;
3 = a311 + a322 + a333:
Following this triangular system, we can decompose the joint proba-
bility (5) into the product of three conditional independent Gaussian
probabilities. The rst marginal probability is dened as:
Pr(1;j 1 < z^1 + a111 < 1;j) = [
1;j   z^1
a11
]  [1;j 1   z^1
a11
]; (7)
and can be evaluated directly because (:) is the CDF of 1. The
second conditional probability is:
Pr(2;k 1 < z^2 + a211 + a222 < 2;kj1;j 1 < z^1 + a111 < 1;j)
= [
2;k   z^2   a211
a22
]  [2;k 1   z^2   a211
a22
];
where (:) is the CDF of 2. The third conditional probability is:
Pr(3;l 1 < z^3 + a311 + a322 + a333 < 3;l
j2;k 1 < z^2 + a211 + a222 < 2;k; 1;j 1 < z^1 + a111 < 1;j)
= [
3;l   z^3   a311   a322
a33
]  [3;l 1   z^3   a311   a322
a33
]; (8)
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where (:) is the CDF of 3. The rst marginal probability can be
evaluated directly, using a standard numerical routine for Gaussian
CDFs. The second probability is conditional on the distribution of
1, which is unobserved. The idea of the GHK algorithm is to replace
1 by a random draw from a truncated Gaussian distribution in order
to evaluate the probability of a basic event and write the likelihood
function. Of course, several draws have to be made as we shall detail
below. Let us call r1 the rth draw of 1 so that we have now:
[
2;k   z^2   a21r1
a22
]  [2;k 1   z^2   a21
r
1
a22
]; (9)
where r1 comes from a truncated standard normal density with lower
and upper truncation points equal to (1;j 1   z^1)=a11 and (1;j  
z^1)=a11 respectively. The third conditional probability includes two
Gaussian random variables, the same 1 as before and 2. We use the
same r1 as before and draw 2 from a truncated Gaussian so as to
have:
[
3;l   z^3   a31r1   a32r2
a33
]  [3;l 1   z^3   a31
r
1   a32r2
a33
]: (10)
This time, r2 is drawn from a standard normal density with lower
and upper truncation points (2;k 1   z^2   a21r1 )=a22 and (2;k  
z^2   a21r1 )=a22. We explain in Appendix C how to draw truncated
random numbers using GHK algorithm.
Since the computation of Equation (7) is straightforward, we shal-
l initialize the algorithm by computing it rst and then recursively
evaluating Equation (9) and (10). Now if we have R draws of 1
and 2, the simulated probability is then the arithmetic mean of each
probability given the rth random draw of r (see Appendix C):
Pr(Y1 = j; Y2 = k; Y3 = l)GHK =
1
R
RX
r=1
[Pr1Prr2Pr
r
3]
where Prr2, Pr
r
3 refer to Equations (9) and (10) respectively given r
th
draw of . Finally, the simulated likelihood function is given by:
LGHK =
NY
i=1
Pr(yi;m = k)GHK
form = f1; 2; 3g and k = f1; 2; 3; 4g and Ym = fy1m;    ; yim;    ; yNmg.
The weighted likelihood function is:
WLGHK =
NY
i=1
Pr(yi;m = k)
wi
GHK ; (11)
where wi is the weight value assigned to individual i as our data set
is a weighted sample.
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5.2 Monte Carlo simulation
Now let's consider a Monte Carlo simulation example in order to verify
that our method is working correctly. We have selected a sample size
of 1 000 and a number of replications equal to 1 000. We rst draw
the three independent explanatory variables X1, X2 and X3 from a
standard normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
1.5. Once we have the X, we select values for the s so as to generate
the latent utilities. We have selected the following structure:
z1 = 0:3 X1   0:6 X2 + 0:9 X3 + 1;
z2 = 0:2 X1   0:3 X2 + 0:6 X3 + 2;
z3 =  0:2 X1 + 0:9 X2 + 1:5 X3 + 3:
The coecients ofX in each equation are chosen arbitrarily. The error
terms 1, 2, 3 are simulated from a trivariate normal distribution
with zero mean and covariance matrix:
Cov
0@12
3
1A =
0@ 1 0:25  0:40:25 1 0:6
 0:4 0:6 1
1A : (12)
The threshold parameters are chosen so as to correspond to the (0.25,
0.50, 0.75) quantiles of the z^m. The ordinal responses Yf1;2;3g are then
generated accordingly.
We report in Table 6 the mean bias when  is treated as an iden-
tity matrix, and the mean bias when  is estimated using the GHK
simulator. Table 7 reports the same results for the MSE. It is well
Table 6: Mean bias for comparing three independent ordered probit
with a trivariate ordered probit
Independent ordered probits Trivariate ordered probit
y1 y2 y3 y1 y2 y3
X1 -0.219 -0.138 0.154 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
X2 0.443 0.210 -0.697 0.002 0.001 0.003
X3 -0.665 -0.419 -1.167 -0.004 -0.001 0.003
21 0.250 0.000
31 -0.400 -0.005
32 0.600 0.006
apparent from these tables, rst that when there is correlation, a se-
rious error is committed if the model is treated as three independent
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Table 7: MSE for comparing three independent ordered probit
with a trivariate ordered probit
Independent ordered probits Trivariate ordered probit
y1 y2 y3 y1 y2 y3
X1 0.050 0.021 0.026 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007
X2 0.199 0.046 0.492 0.0010 0.0007 0.0023
X3 0.447 0.178 1.374 0.0014 0.0009 0.0050
21 0.063 0.0016
31 0.160 0.0018
32 0.360 0.0015
ordered probit models. And second, which is in a way the most im-
portant result, that our method using the GHK simulator managed
to give quite accurate results as well as the access to the correlations.
5.3 Evaluation strategy
The trivariate ordered probit model was programmed using the soft-
ware R. The basic idea is to maximize the simulated likelihood func-
tion, this is done via the package \maxLik" using the \BHHH" algo-
rithm in R. In order to initialize the evaluation, a reasonable set of
starting values has to be provided. In this study, the staring values
are chosen from the coecient estimated from the independent or-
dered probit models while the starting values for the correlations are
set equal to zero. As we have discussed already, several constraints
have to be imposed to ensure that the model is identiable, e.g. the
variance of error terms have been normalized to 1 in this paper.
Another thing which is important in the evaluation of the model is
how to ensure the positive denite property of the variance covariance
matrix . If 21 and 31 are freely chosen between 0 and 1, then the
third term 32 must verify the constraint:
2131  
q
1  221
q
1  231  32  2131 +
q
1  221
q
1  231:(13)
A proof of this result is given in Appendix B. This condition is essen-
tial to improve the eciency of the evaluation along with the iterations
of the MLE process, or try-check (accept/reject) sampling strategy
could be used which is quite slow especially when the correlation di-
mension is more than 2. This correlation condition does not seem to
be commonly applied in most of the statistical softwares and packages
(e.g. the try-check strategy has been used in command \triprobit" in
software STATA without penalty in the likelihood function).
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However this strategy also has limitations when the dimension is
higher than three thus we need to nd another way of constructing .
We shall discuss this later.
6 Empirical results for preference for
redistribution in China
Table 8 reports estimation results for the trivariate ordered probit
model (11) which was discussed in the previous section and which is
meant to explain the answers given to the three ordinal variables de-
picting preference for redistribution and poverty perceptions. We rst
present the unrestricted version of the model. If we set all the individ-
ually insignicant coecients to zero (lower than a 90% signicance
level), the log-likelihood value drops from -17 834 to -17 838.92, with
DF of 20, so the overall restrictions are not rejected. If we now try
to restrict to zero the structural variances (equivalent to considering
three independent ordered probit models), the likelihood value drops
to -17929.04. The dierence is 95.04 with DF of 3, so that this null
restriction is rejected. It is necessary to consider a joint model.
6.1 Structural correlation
Our model provides an ecient way of estimating a correlation ma-
trix among ordinal variables, conditionally on exogenous variables.
Non zero correlation implies that the three variables are mutually en-
dogenous. Table 8 shows that these correlations are not important
in magnitude, but are highly signicant. More precisely, correlation
is very signicant between the preference for redistribution variable
and the two other variables. However, it is not signicant between
the poor-misgovernment and the poor-lazy variables. This means that
these two variables provide independent information on preference for
redistribution. Remember that Alesina and Glaeser (2004), when com-
paring subjective poverty perception in Europe and in the US, were
considering two exclusive justications: lack of eort in the US and
absence of luck in Europe. In China the two types of explanation can
play a complementary role, and that at the same time in the same
mind.
The correlation between preference for redistribution and poor-mis-
government is positive. This means that the variables explaining the
opinion about mis-governance will have also an indirect inuence upon
the preference for redistribution with presumably the same sign. This
means also that individuals thinking that mis-governance is a cause
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Table 8: Preference for redistribution
and poverty perception, a trivariate estimation
Redis. Pref. Poor-misgov Poor-lazy
C. China 0:019
(0:033)
 0:077
(0:033)
0:080
(0:032)
W. China 0:006
(0:029)
 0:108
(0:029)
0:146
(0:029)
birth 60-79 0:081:
(0:043)
0:118
(0:042)
 0:090
(0:043)
birth post 80 0:111
(0:046)
0:115
(0:045)
 0:119
(0:045)
female 0:065:
(0:033)
 0:043
(0:035)
 0:096
(0:033)
party  0:036
(0:036)
 0:086
(0:034)
 0:053
(0:035)
coupled  0:001
(0:039)
 0:037
(0:040)
0:026
(0:038)
yeduc  0:005
(0:005)
 0:017
(0:004)
0:004
(0:004)
ln income 0:104
(0:020)
0:075
(0:019)
 0:008
(0:019)
ln income squared  0:009
(0:002)
 0:007
(0:002)
0:000
(0:002)
Occup. prestige 0:069
(0:069)
 0:023
(0:069)
0:031
(0:066)
Upward (fath./son)  0:131
(0:047)
0:014
(0:048)
 0:118
(0:045)
Upward (moth./dau.)  0:132
(0:052)
0:099:
(0:053)
 0:024
(0:050)
better nance 0:003
(0:026)
0:028
(0:026)
0:164
(0:026)
Rural  0:105
(0:041)
 0:086
(0:040)
0:134
(0:039)
migrant worker 0:187
(0:067)
 0:046
(0:076)
 0:112:
(0:060)
1|2  1:787
(0:093)
 2:123
(0:091)
 0:689
(0:089)
(2|3)-(1|2) 1:075
(0:029)
1:261
(0:032)
1:265
(0:017)
(3|4)-(2|3) 1:491
(0:018)
1:687
(0:019)
1:001
(0:019)
R:P;misgov 0:202

(0:016)
R:P;lazy  0:086
(0:016)
misgov;lazy 0:013
(0:016)
N 5138
Loglik -17 834
R 25
The two Upward dummy variables are 1 if the prestige of a son is higher than
his father's, the same for the variable measuring the upward mobility of a
daughter compared to her mother. They are built using the revised order of
occupation categories provided by the SOR model.
p-value codes: \***" for 0.001, \**" for 0.01, \*" for 0.05 and \." for 0.1.
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for poverty would tend to believe that poverty has to be compensated
by redistribution.
The correlation between preference for redistribution and poor-lazy
is negative and signicant. However, this correlation is much low-
er. So individuals thinking that the main cause of poverty is lazi-
ness are also less in favour of redistribution. However, because of
the smaller correlation, that eect is less important than the previ-
ous one. Consequently the sense of justice detailed and explained
in Alesina and Glaeser (2004) is justied in China as the impact of
poor-misgovernment is more important than that of the poor-lazy for
explaining the preference for redistribution.
The nal consequence of the presence of signicant correlations
is that even if a variable does not appear in the equation explaining
preference for redistribution, it can have an indirect eect provided it
appears signicantly in one of the other equations.
6.2 Poverty perceptions
The estimates of the two equations corresponding to beliefs in the
causes of poverty are reported in column 2 and 3 of Table 8. For
these two equations, both regions and birth cohorts are signicant.
The estimated sign of these two sets of dummy variables in these two
equations shows an exclusive pattern. Generally speaking, individuals
living in the Central or in the Western part of China (compared to
the Eastern Coast region) support less the idea that poverty is gen-
erated by misgovernment while they tend to support the idea that
laziness is the main cause of poverty. New generations support more
the idea that poverty is caused by misgovernment rather than by lazi-
ness. The gender dummy variable enters as a signicant factor only
in the poor-lazy equation. Females tend to impute poverty to laziness
more than males. The negative sign of the party membership dum-
my variable is expected in the poor-misgov equation. Party members
tend to be more condent in the ability of the Party to ght against
poverty. While being a member of the Party makes no signicant
dierences in answering the poor-lazy question. The strong eect of
party membership in the poor-misgov equation is then an evidence
that a self-interest variable can inuence poverty perception.
Living in a couple has no eect in both cases. Having more years of
education weaken the recognition that misgovernment causes poverty
while it has no eect in the poor-lazy equation. The eect of log-
income has an inverted U-shape. But as the rst 25% quantile level
of log-income (7.601) locates on the right hand of the curve peak,
the eect of log-income has then only a monotone decreasing trend
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with an increasing speed. Occupation prestige has no eect in both
equations. Having an upward mobility experience (compared to the
father) drifts negatively the recognition that idleness causes poverty.
Lastly, people who anticipate an upward household nancial situation
agree more that laziness causes poverty.
Rural individuals tend to impute poverty less to misgovernment
while they impute it more to laziness. This result might not be coher-
ent with the evidence found in section 4.2 about occupation mobility.
Farm labour (in the rural group) is the most static category with the
lowest prestige. Implicitly, being rural reduces upward mobility op-
portunities a lot, compared to the urban group. According to the
literature, people having a low upward mobility prospect should be
more in favour of redistribution. However, it is just the reverse here.
This result is comparable to that of the Whyte et al. (2009). We may
guess that it is because the return of physical eorts in farm labour
is more clearly perceived than the return of eort in the urban group.
Rural people tend to believe that poverty is a direct indicator of a
lack of eort. Moreover, as argued in Whyte et al. (2009), compared
to the urban group, the rural group is a relatively more closed so-
ciety with much fewer upstart examples so that people living there
do not perceive an important level of within-group inequality. The
dierent redistribution schemes applied in rural and urban areas also
entail dierences in poverty perception. This might be an evidence
of perception distortion due to Hukou system. We shall discuss this
distortion eect in subsection 6.4.
6.3 Preference for redistribution
Now let's look at the rst column of Table 8 which corresponds to
the estimate of the preference for redistribution equation. The re-
gion dummy eects are not signicant contrary to the birth cohort
eects which are signicant and have a positive eect. This means
that people who were born later are more supportive of redistribu-
tion (Chinese society is changing). Females are more supportive of
redistribution (the positive eect of gender upon preference could be
emphasized via an indirect channel through poor-lazy equation since
the two variables are negatively correlated). This eect has also been
found in the literature for many dierent countries. The party mem-
bership has no signicant direct eect in the preference equation (but
a signicant negative indirect eect via poor-misgov channel). Living
in couple has no signicant eect.
The number of years of education has no signicant eect in the
preference for redistribution equation. Clark and d'Angelo (2008)
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found that more educated people are less in favour of redistribution,
using the BHPS. However, the eect of education upon the preference
for redistribution (after controlling for income) can be ambiguous as
this has been pointed out in Alesina and Giuliano (2009). Higher
educated people could be more altruistic while they could also take
into account the potential loss of their education premium entailed
by redistributive policies. Although we nd no direct eect of educa-
tion upon preference for redistribution, the signicant indirect eect
of education (through the miss-gov channel) cannot not be neglected.
The income eect is monotone and negative as discussed for the
poor-misgov equation. The occupation prestige measured by the s-
caling metric k has no signicant eect while the comparisons made
between the scaling metric of dierent generations are very signi-
cant. This means that people who experienced an upward mobility
compared to their parents are less in favour of redistribution. This
result is then coherent with that of Clark (2003). Remember that
the sign eect for upward mobility between son and father had to be
negative in the poor-lazy equation while it is again negative in the
preference equation and the correlation between these two equations
are found to be negative. This could be due to two reasons: i) the cor-
relation parameter is much smaller than the one between preference
for redistribution and poor-misgovernment equations and ii) one who
has experienced an upward mobility should not agree that poverty is
caused by laziness because that would be equivalent to say that his
father was lazy.
The variable better nance which captures the subjective measure
of the expected household nancial situation has no signicant direct
eect. It only enters with a signicant negative impact via the poor-
lazy channel.
Being rural reduces the support for redistribution but this negative
eect. We also found a very signicant eect of the \rural" variable
in the other two equations. So, the \rural" variable plays a very
important role in poverty perceptions and thus inuences indirectly
preference for redistribution. However, the eect of Hukou system is
still unclear. If the rural-urban barrier (Hukou system) which prevents
rural area migrants from reaching the urban areas did exist, then soci-
ety would be divided into two isolated parts. Thus the Hukou barrier
could inuence in a diverging way preference for redistribution as well
as poverty perception of the two sub-populations (rural and urban).
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that some individuals, while
being registered as rural are in fact migrant workers, living and work-
ing in urban areas. Most of them are occupying low paid physical jobs
and they receive much less social benets compared to the native ur-
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ban residents, see for instance Wong et al. (2007). On the other hand,
what they have experienced and seen in urban areas is totally dier-
ent from what they have seen in their hometown (discrimination and
between group inequality). Thus their preferences and perceptions
are drifted compared to those who have remained in rural areas. The
change in attitude of individuals who have a dual identity (rural iden-
tication and migrant worker status) should modify the interpretation
we have of the rural-urban dichotomy, because the group identied as
being rural is heterogenous. Moreover, the dual identity of migrants
provides a natural experimental subject to understand what would be
the eect of the barrier. I insert a dummy variable \being a migrant
worker" which corresponds to those who are working in an urban area
while still being registered as rural in the year 2006. We see from
the last line of Table 8 that migrant workers believe less that poverty
is caused by laziness but this eect is only signicant at 10% level.
Meanwhile, migrant workers are much more in favour of redistribu-
tion (than those who are simply \rural" or \urban") even if \rural"
individuals have lower preference for redistribution compared to urban
individuals and thus the migrant group desire most the redistribution
among the population. Clearly, the discriminations entailed by the
Hukou policy have signicant eects upon inequality perceptions and
preference for redistribution.
6.4 Being migrant as an endogenous variable
However, we might ask the following question: What are the charac-
teristics of these \migrant workers", and what are their motivations
to migrate given the fact that they might face discriminations, have
a weak social capital, that they have left behind their children and so
on? Despite the prospect of a better payment, the decision to migrate
is not an easy one, as described in Wong et al. (2007). Thus, it is rea-
sonable to think that \being migrant" is an endogenous variable in our
attitude equations. There are two potential sources of endogeneity:
- Omitted variables that determinate both attitudes and the mi-
gration decision, e.g. experiences documented by other people.
- Reverse causality, i.e. although attitudes may be aected by
migration experience, people holding dierent attitudes about
poverty and redistribution may also take dierent decisions whether
to migrate or not.
Ignoring the endogeneity bias may lead to estimation and interpreta-
tion problems. A standard consistent estimate of the treatment eect
in a linear framework is IV estimation. However, as we are within a
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high non-linear framework, especially when the endogenous variable
is also discrete (\being migrant" is a binary variable), the solution is
less evident.
Instead of a 2SLS or Heckman two-step estimation as for linear
models,5 I consider a simultaneous triangular system:
Ym = k  1[m;k 1  X 0m + mD + m  m;k];
D = 1[ ~X 0+ Z 0 +  > 0]:
The rst equation represents our previous ordered probit model when
the second equation is a simple probit model that determines what
are the characteristics of the \migrant workers" (here the zero-one
variable D) within the rural group, given that X; ~X may or may not
have identical elements, that ~X  X and (X;Z) ? (m; ), where ?
denotes statistical independence. The error terms of these two groups
of equations are m and . The joint distribution of the error terms is
a multivariate normal with
(m; )
0  Nm+1(Fm(m); F(); ):
The endogeneity problem exist whenever m; is non-zero. The deci-
sion of migration concerns only the rural group, i.e. individuals having
a \rural" status, which is a subgroup of our full sample. As we consid-
er an enlarged model, we have to dene an enlarged correlation matrix
 as follows:
 =
0BB@
1 12 13 14
21 1 23 24
31 32 1 34
41 42 43 1
1CCA : (14)
The upper left 3  3 part of this matrix involves the whole sample
while the last column and last row of this correlation matrix concern
only the rural group.
Empirically, we are facing three diculties:
i) by adding a new probit equation, the dimension of our system
increases to 4, thus it is not evident how to construct a PDS
correlation matrix  for the GHK algorithm6
52SLS does not always provide an average causal eect, but it provides a local average
causal eect, as it has been documented in the literature by Angrist and Pischke (2008).
Another reason for not using 2SLS is that it would ignore the non-linear structure. Heck-
man two step estimation (with a correction term) is neither a good candidate as indicated
in Freedman and Sekhon (2010).
6The correlation constraints found in case of 33 do not hold in the 44 case because
for example, by given value of 21, 31, 41, the interval of 32 is jointly determined by
the function of (21; 31) and (42; 43) while the later pair is also unknown.
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ii) how to identify the m in this triangular system?
iii) what would be a proper instrumental variable?
To answer the rst question, instead of treating with the correlation
constrains, I start by building a lower triangular matrix A such that
 = AA0 which would correspond to the Cholesky decomposition of
. This matrix A is built in such a way that:
A =
0BBBB@
1 0 0 0
s21
p
1  s221 0 0
s31 s32
p
1  s231   s232 0
s41 s42 s43
p
1  s241   s242   s243
1CCCCA (15)
with
i 1j s
2
ij < 1 8i > 1:
This last condition has to be imposed line by line and is obtained by
the spherical coordinate system dened for n-dimensional Euclidean
space7 with a radical coordinate variable r 2 [0; 1] and n  1 angular
coordinates !1; !2;    ; !n 1 where !n 1 2 [0; 2[ and other angles
range over [0; 2]. We then have:
si1 = ri cos(!1) (16)
si2 = ri sin(!1) cos(!2)
...
si;i 1 = ri sin(!1)    sin(!i 3) sin(!i 2)
Consequently, the resulting  = AA0 will automatically fulll the
positive denite condition and will have unit elements along its diag-
onal. This method can be generalized to higher dimension problems
straightforwardly as shown in Equations (16). The method we de-
signed for the 33 case is more ecient as it is purely analytical, but
cannot be easily generalized for larger cases, if possbile.
Secondly, there is much controversy in the literature concerning the
exclusion restrictions in a LDV model with discrete endogenous vari-
ables. For example, Wilde (2000) argue that the exclusion restrictions
are statistically not required. However, as pointed out by Chesher
and Smolinski (2012) and Meango and Mourie (2013) among others,
the exclusion restrictions are indeed essential to identify the model.
In our model, the instrumental variable Z only appears in the probit
equation and is excluded from the attitude equations.
7n stands for the matrix dimension
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Thirdly, we need an instrument that is exogenous and brings eect
upon attitudes through the channel of the \migration worker" dummy
variable. In this paper I have chosen the dummy variable: being the
eldest among respondent's siblings. The birth order is random for
a given person, is exogenous and has no direct eect upon attitudes
for inequality and redistribution. However, being the eldest person
among siblings would have a higher incentive to be migrant worker in
order to support the family or even to raise the younger siblings.
The GHK simulation estimation for trivariate ordered probit model
can be extended to a trivariate ordered probit + a probit model once
we are able to construct a positive denite correlation matrix making
use of (15).
In Table 9, I give the estimation results for this new specication
and I contrast them to the results of Table 8. First of all, what are
the characteristics of migrant workers? They are more likely to be
from the East-coast region, to belong to the younger generation, to
be the eldest among siblings. In the last probit equation, I do not in-
sert other variables that are present in the attitude equations because
they are potentially not exogenous variables for my dummy dependent
variable \being a migrant". Then we shall notice that by correcting
for the endogeneity bias of being a \migrant worker", the treatmen-
t eect of the dummy \migrant worker" has dramatically increased
at very signicant level in all of the three attitude equations while we
found no signicant changes for the other coecients corresponding to
exogenous variables. Except for the coecient of the variable \being
rural" which has also changed as now \rural" individuals do not iden-
tify themselves with the poor-lazy argument while only the migrant
group does so. Among the full sample, migrant workers are more in
favour of redistribution, more likely to identify with the arguments
that poverty is caused by misgovernment and laziness. Meanwhile,
the correlation coecient between the migrant equation and the oth-
er equations, ;m are all signicant with a negative sign. Thus the
endogeneity bias correction is justied. These spurious correlation-
s ;m actually explain the downward endogenous bias of the nave
model as the last line in Table 8 reports much lower estimates for
the migrant variable. The correlation between poor-misgov equation
and poor-lazy equation becomes now signicant with a positive sign,
although this correlation is very close to zero. This might not be very
surprising because migrant workers (a subgroup of the \rural" group)
hold the same positive attitude towards poor-misgov and poor-lazy
arguments.
29
Table 9: Preference for redistribution
and poverty perception: Being migrant is treated as endogeneous
Redis. Pref. Poor-misgov Poor-lazy Migrant
Constant  1:687
(0:161)
C. China 0:024
(0:034)
 0:073
(0:034)
0:089
(0:032)
 0:155
(0:076)
W. China  0:005
(0:030)
 0:111
(0:030)
0:142
(0:030)
 0:042
(0:073)
birth 60-79 0:080:
(0:044)
0:110
(0:044)
 0:100
(0:045)
0:342
(0:126)
birth post 80 0:094
(0:048)
0:089:
(0:047)
 0:148
(0:048)
0:576
(0:131)
female 0:075
(0:034)
 0:028
(0:035)
 0:081
(0:034)
 0:117:
(0:065)
party  0:023
(0:037)
 0:089
(0:035)
 0:067:
(0:036)
0:148:
(0:081)
coupled 0:019
(0:042)
0:013
(0:042)
0:031
(0:040)
 0:160:
(0:089)
eldest among siblings 0:163
(0:064)
yeduc  0:006
(0:005)
 0:016
(0:005)
0:004
(0:005)
ln income 0:101
(0:020)
0:079
(0:019)
 0:012
(0:019)
ln income squared  0:009
(0:002)
 0:008
(0:002)
0:001
(0:002)
Occup. prestige 0:062
(0:071)
 0:051
(0:072)
0:049
(0:068)
Upward (fath./son)  0:143
(0:049)
0:038
(0:050)
 0:148
(0:046)
Upward (moth./dau.)  0:131
(0:053)
0:108:
(0:055)
 0:062
(0:051)
better nance  0:000
(0:027)
0:035
(0:026)
0:167
(0:026)
Rural  0:155
(0:046)
 0:160
(0:044)
0:068
(0:043)
migrant worker 0:693
(0:206)
0:673
(0:217)
0:812
(0:197)
1|2  1:792
(0:096)
 2:103
(0:094)
 0:693
(0:091)
(2|3)-(1|2) 1:057
(0:030)
1:259
(0:034)
1:251
(0:020)
(3|4)-(2|3) 1:475
(0:019)
1:666
(0:022)
0:991
(0:021)
correlation R:P;misgov 0:214

(0:019)
;R:P  0:236
(0:094)
parameters R:P;lazy  0:067
(0:006)
;misgov  0:340
(0:115)
(spurious) misgov;lazy 0:040

(0:020)
;lazy  0:446
(0:132)
N 5138 2931
Loglik -17 829
R 25
I have used the same random draws for m as for Table 8 and a new set of
draws for .
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7 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have discussed the determinants of preference for
redistribution along with the subjective perception of the origins of
poverty. It is obvious that the self-interest variables are not the sole
factors at action here, there are also some unobserved factors such as
ideology and psychological traits. The preference for redistribution
and the poverty perceptions are correlated topics and the causalities
are complex. If they are correlated in unobserved ways (mutually
endogenous), the standard independent estimation may leads to an
ineciency problem and less information could be provided. A mul-
tivariate ordered probit model is designed to capture the condition-
al correlations of correlated ordinal variables. An extended triangu-
lar specication has been applied in order to correct the endogenous
treatment eect bias of a binary variable. The estimation via GHK
simulator algorithm allows many modelling exibilities and the way
of constructing a positive denite matrix discussed in this paper is
essential when the dimension of the correlation matrix is high (3  3
or more).
Several evidence has been found in this paper, using the proposed
model. First of all, the correlations among preference for redistribu-
tion and the poverty perceptions are important. These results pro-
vide a proof of the existence of sense of justice. Meanwhile, lazi-
ness and misgovernment are not two negatively correlated causes for
poverty, at least in the perception of the Chinese people. The corre-
lations also allow us to investigate the direct and indirect eects of
explanatory variables in this simultaneous system, e.g. the eect of
party membership and being rural have no direct eect upon prefer-
ence for redistribution but they could have some inuences through
indirect channels of the poverty perceptions. From the estimates of
poor-misgov and poor-lazy equation, we see that circumstances drift
perceptions too. The dierences in perceptions between rural and ur-
ban group is mainly due to the rural-urban policy barrier. I found
that being migrant is endogenous to inequality attitudes and a con-
sistent estimation of \being migrant" shows very important barrier
discrimination eect upon attitudes. Our results also provide proofs
of the most discussed economic theory in the redistribution preference
topic, i.e. the intergenerational mobility eect.
In this paper we also discussed the occupation mobility and pres-
tige in China. Our evidence suggests that the widely used EGP occu-
pation category might not reect the correct social ladder in China,
thus in order to use it, one shall be cautious and some readjustments
are necessary.
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A Properties of the Transition Matrix
A.1 Mobility indices
A transition matrix P has K independent rows. Each row indicates
the probability to change from status j to status k the next period and
sums to 1. Overall mobility can be summarised using a Prais (1955)
index,
MP (P ) = (K   Tr(P ))=(K   1):
MP (P ) = 0 is perfect immobility whileMP (P ) = 1 is perfect mobility.
B Proof
If two vectors a and b with zero mean and variance of 1 who are in an
inner product space, according to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we shall
have:
jha; bij 
p
ha; aihb; bi (17)
so that:
 1  ha; bipha; aihb; bi = ab  1 (18)
Given the fact that the correlations ab and bc
8 are within 0 and
1 while the correlation ac is unknown, the problem can be solved
by using the orthgonal decomposition. Since both vector a and c are
correlated to vector b and their correlations are known, we can rewrite
a and c as:
a = ha; bib+Oab
c = hc; bib+Ocb
where Oab is the orthogonal projection of vector a onto b. Then the
correlaion between a and c can be written as:
ac = ha; ci = habb+Oab ; bcb+Ocbi = abbc + hOab ;Ocbi (19)
and because that:
 1  hO
a
b ;O
c
biphOab ;Oab ihOcb;Ocbi  1
8Vector c has also mean of zero and variane of 1
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and:
ha; ai = habb+Oab ; abb+Oab i = 2ab + hOab ;Oab i
) hOab ;Oab i = 1  2ab
because variance of a is 1, we then have the following condition that:
 
q
(1  2ab)(1  2bc)  hOab ;Ocbi 
q
(1  2ab)(1  2bc) (20)
Finally, by replacing Inequation (20) into Equation 19 we have:
abbc  
q
(1  2ab)(1  2bc)  ac  abbc +
q
(1  2ab)(1  2bc)
C RNG
Draw a random number  from a truncated standard normal distri-
bution, for example from f(ja <  < b), I apply an inverse sampling
approach:
1. First draw rth random number r from uniform(0,1) distribution.
2. Dene r = (1  r)(a) + r(b)
3. Obtain  =  1(r) which relies between a and b.
Notice that the random numbers are drawn once and kept (McFadden
1989) when parameters vary during the MLE process.
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